The Spanish CNT-FAI Anarchist Defense Cadre Operating Concept
Organizational Lessons from the Spanish Civil War
Observers of many political stripes, but particularly the dissident right, have turned their eyes from the United States’ first Civil War to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 as the analog to a potential North American chimp-out. This author would like to point out that there are many ways in which the US of The Current Year + Whatever is not similar to Spain, but the situations do rhyme. It is also worth acknowledging that some of this comparative framing may be wishful thinking due to the traditionalist victory in Spain. We must be brutally honest in our assessments, and identify our weaknesses and strengths based upon the data at hand. An American Good Guy victory of the sort seen in Spain by their Nationalists – not a monolith, but rather a necessity-driven mashup of multiple factions – likely depends upon the rising of A Great Man of History as was Generalissimo Franco (PBUH).
This essay will share with you, the reader, some very useful information I have found while researching revolutionary Spain for my upcoming prequel to Faction (available SOON). Why is it notable? The CNT-FAI, a leftist underground group, successfully mobilized 20,000 fighters in Barcelona when the Nationalists attempted their coup on July 17, 1936 and secured the city. They similarly mobilized many thousands of armed men in many other cities and in so doing secured – initially – vast swathes of Spanish territory and began the terror, or Revolución Social, for which they had been preparing. A note for the spergs – I’m using extreme shorthand, lest this article go on and on and on.
The CNT-FAI was, and still is, an organized but secretive collection of militant anarchists who are members of the official, above-ground CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, or National Confederation of Labor) anarcho-syndicalist labor union. From 1927-1936, the FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica, or Iberian Anarchist Federation) selected militant members of the CNT for vetting and eventual membership in their collective. There was further secret organization of regional Defense Committees, which established a cellular organizing structure, the defense cadres, to train and prepare for social revolution. Per Agustín Guillamón’s Ready for Revolution: The CNT Defense Committees in Barcelona, 1933-1938, the CNT established a figure of 15% of weekly revenue of CNT member dues to finance the Defense Committees, and focused intently upon measuring and reporting on the material, technical and morale needs to ensure their growth and effectiveness. Quoting a CNT-FAI internal document:
In the absence of preparation, there is no revolution—and the more intense and shrewder the preparations, the more the revolution will prosper when the day comes. We must end the weakness for improvisation and hot-headed schemes as the only [feasible] solutions in difficult times. That mistake, of trusting to the creative instincts of the masses, has cost us very dearly.
What follows is a brief summary of organizational and operational concepts for the six-man defense cadres defined in a 1934 resolution from the CNT National Committee of Defense Committees, again from Guillamón. You can find a PDF copy of the book here – it’s worth reading.
The secretary organizes the cadre and communicates and coordinates with rest of the org via a district secretary. He creates more cadres as able.
The people investigator “identif[ies] and register[s] the names, addresses, ideological affiliations, personal details, habits, and danger of enemies within his group’s allotted precinct. The reference to danger alluded to the profession or ideology of the enemy: ‘military, police, clergy, officials, bourgeois and Marxist politicians, gunmen, fascists, etc.’”
The building investigator learns everything about buildings in zone. He draws plans, identifies features, residents, access points, structural strengths and vulnerabilities, with a focus on compiling “figures for the human resources, items, and weapons found in barracks, police stations, jails, churches and monasteries, political and employers’ clubs, fortifications, etc.”
A team member is responsible for identifying strategic areas in zone and developing plans and drills for street fighting tactics, ever expanding: “bridges, underground passages, drains, sewers, houses with flat roofs, escape doors leading to different streets, fire escapes, or inner courtyards.”
A team member is responsible for monitoring public works and services activity: “lighting, water, garages, tram depots, the metro, transport routes, and their vulnerability to sabotage or seizure.”
A team member who sources money, weapons and equipment: “locating and assessing the vulnerability of places from which arms, money, and supplies might be procured for the revolution, including armories, private homes of weapon-owners, banks, loan offices, food and clothing warehouses, etc.”
What follows are notes and extrapolations I’ve compiled from reading about the CNT-FAI and other similarly organized groups. The concept is eminently sound, and would suffice for coordinating loosely organized allies for any purpose – freelance search and rescue, a lending library, an independent social club, joint homeschooling, and so on.
The secretary creates cadres of vetted people, either assembled or developed from an existing social group – ideally family or life-long friends to ensure loyalty and group cohesion.
New cadre members are trained in their skill set by veterans and specialists in their assigned role from another cadre in another district where possible, preferably not neighboring or where they may run into each other outside of a collective action. The secretary manages introductions and communications; for security purposes, trainers and trainees are not permitted to interact outside of training, save for specialized group operations. Training follows crawl/walk/run process, with trainers reviewing trainees’ work for a time to ensure competence. While it would be ideal to have a cadre consisting of team members who are, for example, military or law enforcement veterans, their greatest effect would be as force multipliers; by training others in their skill sets and up to a standard, and leading those trained teams, when necessary, in larger operations, they will make a much greater impact than existing as an isolated cadre. It is up to the secretary to evangelize this concept among his cadres. Similarly, men (and women) in upper age brackets may be called upon when the time is right for specific actions, but they can best serve in intelligence gathering and training, coordinating, sheltering, transporting, feeding and equipping the inexperienced and energetic youths who need your guidance. Your contributions are very valuable!
Note: cadre members are evaluated for their competence but are allowed to develop and make small mistakes so long as they don’t harm or endanger the group. If a member has difficulty with their duties, they can serve in another fashion.
Cadre members work with code names, preferably all on a common theme. Cadres may or may not have team names. Cadres may or may not know the team name used by the secretary for reporting to the district secretary, and individual code names are never entered into a report by the secretary. Numbers and animal variants work well as code names. Code names are best used only when cadre is meeting or operating and must not be used in daily life. Cadre members will not communicate with one another via establishment technology or infrastructure, nor will they carry devices with them to meetings or operations.
Cadres meet at least weekly, with the secretary providing formal structure. As cadre members are already vetted, little time is dedicated to political theory or indoctrination, unless a given project requires it. Early sessions are devoted to development of basic strategies and priorities for cadre members. Each session will include review of each member’s progress, challenges, opportunities for information sharing or division of labor. Team members can work together between meetings to fulfill certain requirements. Examples:
Large-scale surveillance or assessment operations
People investigator and building investigator leverage each other’s skill sets and information.
Similarly, the strategy and tactics specialist works with the building investigator, prioritizing efforts and sharing information.
Cadres train regularly in individual hand to hand combat, group tactics, weapons, propaganda, special equipment, medicine, etc. The secretary will coordinate supplemental, specialized training from outside of the cadre where appropriate.
Depending upon the needs and skill sets of the cadre and that of the organization in general, cadres will develop a broad set of necessary capabilities but may specialize in manufacturing, propaganda, etc. but not at the cost of their core mission of intelligence, growth of the organization via new reliable cadres, and eventual control of their assigned district.
As cadres amass intelligence and refine their equipment and plans, they will begin to make copies of intelligence, or refine it into information packages, for redundancy as well as sharing up-organization.
The secretary will bring priorities, missions and information requests for cadres from up-org.
The secretary provides a summary report to the district secretary of each cadre’s weekly progress, as well as relevant findings. Avoid paper / physical record except where necessary, such as maps or intelligence reports.
In situations in which financing and supply is not available from on high, cadres commit to fixed, relevant but affordable financial dues each month or week, which is used to finance operations and equipment. A “tithe” is a good goal. Example:
One month’s dues from all five working cadre members should suffice to purchase one handgun, support equipment and ammunition.
Specialty equipment that cannot be sourced individually, stolen, borrowed, etc. can be purchased with cadre funds if the cadre so votes.
Cadres should leverage their trades and skillsets to manufacture equipment useful to their cadre, as well as others, distributed via the secretaries. Examples: FAI bombs, holsters, ammunition pouches, web gear, packs, clothing / disguises, uniform coveralls, medical kits, posters or pamphlets, burglary equipment, etc.
Retail acquisition of military equipment can be expensive, slow, and highly visible. Volunteers are welcome to equip themselves, but the “best bang for the peseta” comes via collective, bulk acquisition. Standardization contributes to a sense of solidarity and belonging – issued, standard equipment reinforces the group identity and morale. Additionally, sourcing equipment internally allowed the FAI to develop parallel institutions and its own economy, supporting brothers and sisters rather than enemies. The motive is not profit, but independence.
Cost of equipment is reduced to raw materials and time.
Develops FAI members’ capabilities.
Collectively supported – could be purchased by FAI cadres with cash or via barter.
A newer cadre, for example, may have consisted of saddlers and tanners who both finance and acquire equipment by manufacturing holsters, ammunition pouches, belts, gloves. Cadres with access to metal casting equipment could produce FAI bomb components to furnish to the district FAI bomb assembly teams.
Secretaries evaluate such propositions and solicit feedback from the rest of the org for feasibility and demand.
Cadre monthly dues would go to raw materials, multiplying value and buying power through production of finished products.
While the FAI did not condemn theft from capitalist class, materials and equipment must not be stolen from cadre members’ employers, as such activities are too visible. Always think best return on investment.